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UNITED STATES v. MALLOY: UNREASONABLY DENYING
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS A REASONABLE MISTAKE
OF AGE DEFENSE IN THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT
ANNE E. DI SALVO*
In United States v. Malloy,1 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit considered whether criminal defendants charged
with producing pornographic depictions of minors in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2251(a) should be allowed to present a reasonable mistake of
age defense.2  Affirming defendant Michael Malloy’s conviction, the
court held as follows: (1) the statutory text, legislative history, and
prior judicial interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) suggest that a de-
fendant’s knowledge of his victim’s age is “neither an element of the
offense nor textually available as an affirmative defense,”3 and (2) Sec-
tion 2251(a) is not unconstitutionally overbroad in limiting speech
otherwise protected by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.4  In so holding, the court correctly determined that Sec-
tion 2251(a) does not enumerate knowledge of a victim’s age as an
element of the offense,5 and, similarly, correctly followed recent pre-
cedent to conclude that the text of Section 2251(a) does not permit
criminal defendants to present a reasonable mistake of age defense at
trial.6  In interpreting the constitutionality of Section 2251(a), how-
ever, the court wrongfully neglected to engraft a narrow reasonable
mistake of age defense by mischaracterizing sister circuit precedent
and failing to properly balance competing social interests.7  Ulti-
mately, the court could have upheld Malloy’s conviction and success-
fully protected children from the pornography industry without an
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1. 568 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1736 (2010).
2. Id. at 169.
3. Id. at 171.
4. Id. at 176.
5. See infra Part IV.A.1.
6. See infra Part IV.A.2.
7. See infra Part IV.B.1–2.
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absolute determination that a reasonable mistake of age defense is not
constitutionally necessary for Section 2251(a).8  Thus, in failing to
carve out a narrow reasonable mistake of age defense, the Malloy court
set the stage to chill future constitutionally protected speech.9
I. THE CASE
In October 2005, Aaron Burroughs, a friend of defendant
Michael Malloy, brought a fourteen-year-old girl, “S.G.,” to Malloy’s
home to participate in sexual activity with both men.10  Burroughs
and Malloy took turns videotaping each other while having sex with
S.G.11  At the time, Malloy was a thirty-three-year-old United States
Capitol Police Officer.12  Burroughs coached junior varsity high
school football at S.G.’s school, and S.G. managed his team.13  On a
second occasion in the fall of 2005, Burroughs again brought S.G. to
Malloy’s home to have sex with the two men.14  The record is unclear
as to whether S.G. was fourteen or had just turned fifteen at the time
of the second encounter.15
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) began investigating
Malloy’s involvement in producing the videotape of himself, Bur-
roughs, and S.G. in the summer of 2006.16  When FBI agents inter-
viewed Malloy, he admitted to having sex with S.G. on two occasions
and videotaping one encounter.17  FBI agents searched Malloy’s home
and found a camcorder with a videotape of Malloy and Burroughs
having sex with S.G.18  Malloy later admitted that he thought S.G.
“‘looked young,’” but he explained that he did not investigate her age
beyond simply asking her how old she was.19  Malloy was ultimately
indicted for sexual exploitation of a minor for the purpose of produc-
ing a visual depiction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).20
8. See infra Part IV.C.1.
9. See infra Part IV.C.2.
10. United States v. Malloy, 568 F.3d 166, 169 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
1736 (2010).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. The relevant statutory language states:
Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor
to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who
transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any
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Prior to his trial, Malloy filed a motion to dismiss his indictment,
arguing that the indictment exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause
power.21  The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
denied Malloy’s motion, finding that both the Fourth Circuit and the
United States Supreme Court had previously upheld Congress’s power
to prohibit the production of child pornography.22
The Government moved in limine to preclude Malloy from intro-
ducing evidence to support a reasonable mistake of age defense.23
Emphasizing the similarity between Section 2251(a) cases and statu-
tory rape cases, the district court granted the Government’s motion to
preclude Malloy from presenting a mistake of age defense.24  None-
theless, the district court subsequently allowed Malloy’s attorney to ar-
gue that Malloy could not have possibly discovered S.G. was under
eighteen.25  The court found that Malloy never saw any documenta-
tion indicating that S.G. had reached the age of majority, and, conse-
quently, it refused to reverse its original ruling.26  Ultimately, however,
the court allowed Malloy to present evidence at trial that would have
supported a reasonable mistake of age defense.27
Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor en-
gage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual
depiction of such conduct . . . shall be punished . . . if such person knows or has
reason to know . . . that [the] visual depiction was produced or transmitted using
materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate
or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer . . . .
18 U.S.C.A. § 2251(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009).
21. Malloy, 568 F.3d at 169. Malloy argued that he was unaware he was producing child
pornography when he filmed himself with S.G. Id. at 180.  He further argued that his
indictment exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause power because his conduct made him
neither a “‘supplier’” nor “‘consumer’” of child pornography, and that his production did
not affect the pornography market on a national scale. Id.
22. Id. at 169–70.  The district court further noted that the Commerce Clause enables
Congress to regulate intrastate activities “‘so long as they are a part of an economic class of
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.’” Id. (citation omitted).
23. Id. at 169.
24. Id. at 170. In justifying its decision to prohibit Malloy from presenting a mistake of
age defense, the district court noted that Congress specifically intended to protect minors
from sexual abuse when it enacted § 2251(a). Id.
25. Id. at 170 n.1. Specifically, the court allowed Malloy’s attorney to proffer evidence
that Malloy had attempted to determine S.G.’s age. Id.
26. Id.
27. See id. The court allowed Malloy’s attorney to ask S.G. at trial whether Burroughs
instructed her to lie about her age, whether she ever told Malloy her true age, and whether
she posted false information about her age on the Internet. Id.  Additionally, the district
court allowed Malloy to impeach S.G. with prior inconsistent statements about her age. Id.
The court even allowed Malloy to testify that he believed S.G. to be a nineteen-year-old
college student. Id. Although the court admitted this evidence, it later concluded that the
evidence Malloy presented regarding S.G.’s age contained little relevance and, in retro-
spect, probably should not have been allowed in the first place. Id.
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At trial, the prosecution established that S.G. was born in Novem-
ber of 1990, confirming that she was fourteen years old when Malloy
made the tape of her having sex with him and Burroughs in October
2005.28  Malloy stipulated that the tape represented a visual depiction
of himself having sexual intercourse with S.G. and also that the tape
proved “beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used S.G. to
take part in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a
visual depiction of that conduct.”29
Arguing that his indictment had been constructively amended to
require that his actions be committed “knowingly,” Malloy moved for
an acquittal at the close of the prosecution’s case.30  The district court
denied Malloy’s motion, finding that the use of the word “knowingly”
in Malloy’s indictment was “superfluous” language and not a construc-
tive amendment to the indictment.31
On September 20, 2007, a jury convicted Malloy of violating Sec-
tion 2251(a).32  The district court sentenced him to the statutory mini-
mum of fifteen years in prison.33  Malloy appealed his case to the
Fourth Circuit, which considered, among other issues, whether the
district court erred in refusing to allow Malloy to present a mistake of
age defense.34
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Because the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) does not provide for a
reasonable mistake of age defense, federal appellate courts have
reached different conclusions as to whether to judicially engraft this
affirmative defense in response to the Supreme Court’s overbreadth
28. Id. at 170.
29. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). On appeal, Malloy again ar-
gued that the Government’s burden of proof had been substantially lowered because de-
spite the use of the word “knowingly” in his indictment, the Government was not required
to prove that Malloy knew his victim’s true age. Id. at 177; see also infra note 34 and accom- R
panying text (noting that Malloy’s indictment was one of four issues the Fourth Circuit
considered on appeal).
31. Malloy, 568 F.3d at 170 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 170–71.  In sentencing Malloy, the trial court rejected Malloy’s argument that
this mandatory minimum sentence violated his Eighth Amendment protection against
cruel and unusual punishment by being disproportionate to the crime committed. Id. at
171.
34. Id. at 171. The Fourth Circuit additionally considered three other issues on appeal:
(1) whether the indictment under which Malloy was charged was constructively amended;
(2) whether § 2251(a) was a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power as ap-
plied to Malloy; and (3) whether Malloy’s sentence violated his Eighth Amendment right
against cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
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doctrine.  Section 2251(a) has never been textually interpreted to
mean that knowledge of a victim’s age is an element of the offense,35
and, similarly, a court has never textually interpreted Section 2251(a)
to include a reasonable mistake of age defense.36  In considering the
constitutionality of similar criminal statutes, however, the Supreme
Court has adopted an overbreadth doctrine, which allows courts to
balance competing social interests in determining whether to judi-
cially engraft affirmative defenses for statutes like Section 2251(a).37
In applying the Supreme Court’s overbreadth doctrine specifically to
Section 2251(a) cases, moreover, federal circuit courts have split.38
A. Recent Textual Interpretation of Section 2251(a) Neither Includes
Knowledge of the Victim’s Age as an Element of
Section 2251(a) Offenses nor Allows Criminal Defendants
to Present a Reasonable Mistake of Age Defense
The text, legislative history, and recent judicial interpretations of
18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) do not require the Government to prove that the
defendant knew the victim’s age and further deny criminal defend-
ants the ability to present a reasonable mistake of age defense.39  In
denying criminal defendants the ability to present this defense, courts
have preferred the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of statutory
interpretation, which infers that all omissions in a statute should be
interpreted as intentional exclusions,40 to the rule of lenity, which sug-
gests that ambiguous criminal statutes should be construed in favor of
the defendant.41
1. Section 2251(a) Does Not Include Knowledge of the Victim’s Age
as an Element of the Offense
The text, legislative history, and recent judicial interpretations of
Section 2251(a) do not mandate that the Government prove that a
criminal defendant knew his victim’s age before producing porno-
graphic images to be convicted under this statute.  The text of the
statute provides:
Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices,
or coerces any minor to engage in . . . any sexually explicit
35. See infra Part II.A.1.
36. See infra Part II.A.2.
37. See infra Part II.B.
38. See infra Part II.C.
39. See infra Part II.A.1–2.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 71–77. R
41. See infra notes 65–70 and accompanying text. R
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conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of
such conduct . . . shall be punished . . . if such person knows
or has reason to know . . . that [the] visual depiction was
produced or transmitted using materials that have been
mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce by any means, including by
computer . . . .42
On its face, the language of Section 2251(a) does not suggest that
the defendant’s knowledge of his victim’s age is an element of the
offense.43  Since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Morissette
v. United States,44 however, federal courts have been careful not to fol-
low the most obvious reading of a criminal statute in interpreting its
elements.45
Accordingly, federal courts have frequently looked to the legisla-
tive history of Section 2251(a) to further determine its meaning.  In
United States v. United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia (District Court),46 the Ninth Circuit determined that the drafters of
this statute did not intend to require the United States Government,
in prosecuting criminal defendants, to prove that the defendant knew
that his victim had not achieved the age of majority; rather, the court
determined that the drafters merely intended for the Government to
prove that the victim was a minor.47  The Ninth Circuit described Con-
gress’s omission of a defendant’s knowledge of his victim’s age as
“quite clearly deliberate.”48  In fact, the House Conference Report
considering this issue explicitly states: “The conference substitute ac-
cepts the House provision with the intent that it is not a necessary
42. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009).
43. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (District Court), 858 F.2d
534, 536 (9th Cir. 1988).  The statute itself does not allow for a defendant to present an
affirmative defense of reasonable mistake of age. See id. at 537–38 (explaining that the
most plain meaning of § 2251(a) “requires only that a defendant arrange for a minor to
engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of creating a visual depiction, and that
there be a nexus to interstate commerce,” and failing to note any affirmative defense pre-
sent in the statute).
44. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).  In Morissette, the Supreme Court held that knowledge of the
nature of the defendant’s act was an essential element of a federal embezzlement statute
even though this was not the most natural reading of the statute. Id. at 263.
45. See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994) (noting
that the Court is reluctant to follow the “most grammatical reading of the statute” because
of the Morissette precedent).
46. 858 F.3d 534.
47. Id. at 538 (citing S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 29 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
40, 64).
48. Id.  The Court specifically noted that both the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives originally considered making knowledge of the victim’s age an element of the
§ 2251(a) offense but ultimately decided not to do so. Id.
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element of a prosecution that the defendant knew the actual age of
the child.”49
Recent Section 2251 jurisprudence supports the District Court
analysis of the statute’s legislative history.  Noting that a defendant’s
knowledge of his victim’s age is not an essential element for the Gov-
ernment to prove when prosecuting someone under Section 2251, the
Supreme Court differentiated the mens rea requirement of Sec-
tion 2251 from that of Section 2252 in United States v. X-Citement Video,
Inc.50  In X-Citement Video, defendant Rubin Gottesman was convicted
under 18 U.S.C. § 2252 for selling and shipping pornographic video-
tapes featuring a minor.51  On appeal, Gottesman argued that Sec-
tion 2251(a) was facially unconstitutional because it did not contain a
knowledge requirement.52  The Ninth Circuit agreed with Gottesman
and held that Section 2251(a) was facially unconstitutional.53  The Su-
preme Court reversed, however, concluding that knowledge is a re-
quirement of Section 2252 despite the fact that it is not required by
Section 2251(a).54
More recently, in United States v. Deverso,55 the Eleventh Circuit
agreed with the X-Citement Video Court, unanimously holding that a
defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s age is not an element of a Sec-
tion 2251 offense.56  In Deverso, the Department of Homeland Security
obtained information regarding defendant Deverso’s foreign travel
and possession of child pornography, and discovered that Deverso
possessed pornographic images featuring young girls.57  Deverso was
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c)(2)(B) and (e) for “using a minor
to engage in sexually explicit conduct outside of the United States for
the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct and
transporting that visual depiction into the United States.”58  In analyz-
49. H.R. REP. NO. 95-811, at 5 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 69,
69.
50. 513 U.S. at 77–78.  The X-Citement Video Court further noted that the main reason
behind the lack of an intent requirement in § 2251 is that “[pornography] producers are
more conveniently able to ascertain the age of performers.” Id. at 76 n.5.
51. Id. at 65–66.  Section 2252, part of the Protection of Children Against Sexual Ex-
ploitation Act of 1977, prohibits the interstate transportation of any visual depiction of a
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Id. (citation omitted).
52. Id. at 66–67.  Gottesman further argued that § 2252 was unconstitutional as applied
to his case because the tapes in question in his case were not child pornography. Id.
53. Id. at 67.
54. Id. at 77–78.
55. 518 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2008).
56. Id. at 1257.
57. Id. at 1253.
58. Id. at 1252.  Deverso was simultaneously charged and convicted for “possessing
materials involving a depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit activity, in violation
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ing the statutory language of Section 2251(a), the Eleventh Circuit
merely noted that it “disagree[d]” with Deverso’s reading of the stat-
ute59 and cited a number of other cases, including X-Citement Video
and District Court, concluding that knowledge of the victim’s age is not
an element of the Section 2251(a) offense.60
2. Textual Interpretation of Section 2251(a) Denies Criminal
Defendants the Ability to Present a Reasonable Mistake of
Age Defense
When interpreting ambiguous criminal statutes, courts often util-
ize the rule of lenity to avoid punishing criminal defendants who lack
mens rea.61  In its analysis of the text of Section 2251(a), however, the
Eleventh Circuit in Deverso utilized the expressio unius est exclusio alterius
canon of statutory interpretation, rather than the rule of lenity, to
deny criminal defendants charged with Section 2251 crimes the ability
to present a reasonable mistake of age defense.62  Because the text of
Section 2251(a) does not enumerate reasonable mistake of age as an
affirmative defense to the statute,63 the Deverso court utilized expressio
unius reasoning in reaching its conclusion.64
Many courts have utilized the rule of lenity to interpret ambigu-
ous criminal statutes.  The rule of lenity requires courts to interpret
ambiguous statutes in favor of the criminal defendant.65  In Boyce Mo-
tor Lines, Inc. v. United States,66 the Supreme Court utilized the rule of
lenity in interpreting a regulation of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission requiring drivers of vehicles transporting dangerous materials
of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2)” and “transporting materials involving a depiction
of a minor engaged in sexually explicit activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) and
(b)(1).” Id.
59. See id. at 1257 (holding that a defendant does not have to know his victim’s age to
commit a § 2251(a) offense, but failing to further explain its reasoning).
60. Id.
61. See infra notes 65–70 and accompanying text. R
62. See Deverso, 518 F.3d at 1257 (holding that knowledge of the victim’s age is not an
element of a § 2251 offense).  Since the central issue in X-Citement Video concerned § 2252,
the Court did not consider whether the text of § 2251(a) allowed criminal defendants to
present a reasonable mistake of age defense in its opinion. See United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 75–78 (1994) (failing to consider whether § 2251(a) textually
enables criminal defendants to present a reasonable mistake of age defense in its consider-
ation of that statute).
63. See supra notes 20, 42 and accompanying text (quoting the text of § 2251(a) and R
noting that it does not enumerate a reasonable mistake of age defense).
64. See infra text accompanying notes 75–77. R
65. 2 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION § 44A:19 (7th ed. 2009).
66. 342 U.S. 337 (1952).
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to avoid, whenever possible, driving into certain areas.67  Writing for
the majority, Justice Clark offered one justification for utilizing the
rule of lenity to interpret an ambiguous criminal statute: “A criminal
statute must be sufficiently definite to give notice of the required con-
duct to one who would avoid its penalties, and to guide the judge in
its application and the lawyer in defending one charged with its viola-
tion.”68  Because one of the purposes of criminal punishment in our
criminal justice system is to punish those with culpable intent, rea-
soned the Boyce Motor Lines Court, the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion regulation should be interpreted in favor of the defendant, and
the court system should only punish him if he knowingly violated the
regulation.69  The rule of lenity has yet to be applied in Sec-
tion 2251(a) interpretation, however.70
The statutory interpretation canon expressio unius est exclusio alter-
ius assumes that where a statute speaks to certain matters, other omis-
sions were deliberately excluded.71  In Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.,72
the Supreme Court famously utilized expressio unius reasoning to inter-
pret the Warsaw Convention, determining whether the respondent air
carrier had lost the benefit of a damage limitation by failing to comply
with the Montreal Agreement, which required carriers to provide no-
tice of the limitation.73  Writing for the majority, which ruled in favor
of respondent Korean Air Lines, Justice Scalia pronounced, “[W]here
the text is clear . . . we have no power to insert an amendment.”74
The Eleventh Circuit similarly utilized expressio unius reasoning to
deny the defendant’s ability to present a reasonable mistake of age
defense in Deverso.  On appeal in the Eleventh Circuit, Deverso argued
that the trial court should have presented the jury with a reasonable
mistake of age defense instruction with regard to his Section 2251
67. Id. at 338–40.
68. Id. at 340 (citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 458 (1939)).
69. Id. at 342–43; cf. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 n.8, 263 (1952)
(noting that sex offenses are an exception to the general mens rea requirement of criminal
statutes, but holding that although a federal statute criminalizing the taking of government
property does not textually include intent as one of its elements, intent is, nonetheless, a
requisite element of the offense).
70. See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 77–78 (1994) (failing
to mention the rule of lenity in its interpretation of § 2251(a)); United States v. Deverso,
518 F.3d 1250, 1257 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding, without discussing the rule of lenity, that
defendant Deverso was not entitled to present a reasonable mistake of age defense because
knowledge is not an element of a § 2251(a) offense).
71. 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 65, § 47:23. R
72. 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
73. Id. at 123–35.
74. Id. at 134.
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charge.75  Using expressio unius reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit de-
clined to allow Deverso to present such a defense.76  Because the text
of Section 2251(c)(1) does not enumerate a knowledge requirement,
reasoned the Deverso court, criminal defendants are not permitted to
raise a reasonable mistake of age defense under this statute.77
B. The Supreme Court Employs an Overbreadth Doctrine to Balance
Competing Social Interests in First Amendment Jurisprudence
Although every significant Supreme Court decision relating to
child pornography statutes emphasizes the importance of protecting
the well-being of children, the Court has recognized some instances in
which denying a reasonable mistake of age defense could have a chil-
ling effect on constitutionally protected pornography.  The First
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Con-
gress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”78  In determining whether a federal statute im-
pinges on First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court uses the over-
breadth doctrine to balance individual rights protected by the First
Amendment against the necessity of protecting social welfare.79  The
overbreadth doctrine, therefore, empowers courts to judicially engraft
affirmative defenses to criminal statutes when such statutes could po-
tentially chill constitutionally protected speech.80
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,81 the Supreme Court considered
whether the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) could
censor an indecent but non-obscene radio broadcast.82  In a portion
of the Court’s opinion in which Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
joined, Justice Stevens questioned whether the FCC’s regulation of
75. Deverso, 518 F.3d at 1257.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
79. See infra notes 81–97 and accompanying text.  Significantly, the Supreme Court’s R
overbreadth doctrine applies when the statute chills the speech of others; the statute does
not necessarily have to chill the speech of the convicted defendant. See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963) (noting that a statute “may be invalid if it prohibits privi-
leged exercises of First Amendment rights whether or not the record discloses that the
petitioner has engaged in privileged conduct”).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (explaining that the
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine attempts to balance “deter[ring] people from en-
gaging in constitutionally protected speech, [and] inhibiting the free exchange of ideas”
against “invalidating a law . . . directed at conduct so antisocial that it has been made
criminal”).
81. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
82. Id. at 729.
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this broadcast violated the First Amendment.83  Justice Stevens con-
cluded that the regulation of indecency must occur in a factually spe-
cific context and “cannot be adequately judged in the abstract.”84
Finding that the FCC’s regulation of the broadcast in question oc-
curred in the proper context, the Supreme Court held that the FCC’s
regulation did not violate the First Amendment.85
The Court revisited the relationship between the federal regula-
tion of speech and the First Amendment four years later in New York v.
Ferber.86  Here, in considering the constitutionality of a New York stat-
ute prohibiting individuals from “knowingly promoting sexual per-
formances by children under the age of 16 by distributing material
which depicts such performances,”87 the Court noted that society has
a “‘compelling’” interest in protecting the well-being of minors.88
Noting that “a law should not be invalidated for overbreadth unless it
reaches a substantial number of impermissible applications,”89 the
Court concluded that the New York statute was constitutional.90
More recently, in Sabri v. United States,91 the Supreme Court fur-
ther commented that facial challenges based on the overbreadth doc-
trine should not be frequently made.92  The Sabri Court observed that
overbreadth challenges frequently seek to lower the usual standing
requirements, as these challenges invite courts to declare statutes un-
constitutional when applied to theoretical parties or circumstances
not before the court.93  Nevertheless, the Sabri Court enumerated free
speech as a state interest “weighty” enough to overcome its skepticism
of overbreadth challenges.94
83. Id. at 742, 744.
84. Id. at 742.
85. Id. at 730–34. Justice Stevens additionally noted that the Commission’s regulation
may lead some broadcasters to self-censor borderline indecent commentary, but that
“[w]hile some of these references may be protected, they surely lie at the periphery of First
Amendment concern.” Id. at 743.
86. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
87. Id. at 749.
88. Id. at 756–57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607
(1982)).  The Court further noted that its interest in protecting the well-being of minors
validated its decision in Pacifica. Id. at 757.
89. Id. at 771.
90. Id. at 774.
91. 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
92. Id. at 608–09.
93. Id. at 609.
94. Id. at 609–10 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)).
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The Court reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Wil-
liams.95  In Williams, the Court considered whether 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(3)(B), which prohibits the pandering or solicitation of
child pornography, was unconstitutionally overbroad under the First
Amendment.96  In its opinion, the Court confirmed that statutes
prohibiting “a substantial amount of protected speech” are facially in-
valid under the overbreadth doctrine.97  Therefore, although the
Court has seriously limited the circumstances under which the over-
breadth doctrine may be raised in pornography cases, it acknowledges
there may be some circumstances in which the use of the doctrine
may be appropriate to protect speech.
C. Federal Circuit Courts Have Split in Determining Whether to
Judicially Engraft a Reasonable Mistake of Age Defense to
Section 2251(a)
The three federal circuit courts that have considered judicially
engrafting a reasonable mistake of age defense to Section 2251(a)
have split in deciding whether the Constitution requires such engraft-
ing.  Although the Ninth Circuit has determined that the First
Amendment requires courts to judicially engraft a reasonable mistake
of age defense for Section 2251(a),98 the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits
have found that the Constitution does not mandate any affirmative
defense.99  In adopting its position on whether Section 2251(a) consti-
tutionally requires a reasonable mistake of age defense, the Eleventh
Circuit expressly adopted the Eighth Circuit’s position.100
In United States v. United States District Court for the Central District of
California (District Court), the Ninth Circuit explained that although
the defendant’s knowledge of the minor’s age is not a textual element
of a Section 2251(a) offense,101 “the [F]irst [A]mendment does not
permit the imposition of criminal sanctions on the basis of strict liabil-
95. 553 U.S. 285 (2008).  The Williams Court described the purpose of the First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine as balancing opposing social costs. Id. at 292 (citing
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119–20 (2003)).
96. Id. at 288.  The Court ultimately held that this statute was not unconstitutionally
overbroad. Id. at 307.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Souter argued that exceptions to child pornography
statutes should be based on the “need to foil the exploitation of child subjects.” Id. at 310
(Souter, J., dissenting).  Consequently, Justice Souter argued that the First Amendment
protects pornographic depictions of fake children. Id. at 311.
97. Id. at 292 (majority opinion).
98. See infra notes 101–08 and accompanying text. R
99. See infra notes 109–19 and accompanying text. R
100. See infra notes 118–19 and accompanying text. R
101. 858 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 1988).
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ity where doing so would seriously chill protected speech.”102  In Dis-
trict Court, defendant James Marvin Souter, Jr., and two co-defendants
employed a sixteen-year-old girl to appear in a film entitled Those
Young Girls, in which they exhibited her participating in sexually ex-
plicit acts.103  While Souter and his co-defendants stipulated to the
fact that the girl appearing in their film was a minor, they argued that
they were greatly deceived as to her true age.104
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that although Section 2251 regulates
speech that is not protected by the First Amendment—pornography
featuring minors—a “dim and uncertain line” separates protected and
unprotected speech.105  Noting that the First Amendment would pro-
tect Those Young Girls if it did not depict a minor,106 the court pro-
claimed that a pornography producer has no way of being absolutely
certain of an actor’s true age.107  Consequently, the court held that in
the rare circumstance where a defendant, despite his best effort to
obtain an actor’s true age, pornographically depicts a minor on film,
he may present his “reasonable, good-faith belief as to the age of an
actor” in defense of a Section 2251(a) charge.108
In contrast, the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have held that Sec-
tion 2251(a) does not require judicial engraftment of a reasonable
mistake of age defense.  First, in Gilmour v. Rogerson,109 the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that a criminal defendant convicted under Iowa Code Sec-
tion 728.12(1)—a state statute analogous to Section 2251(a)—was not
entitled to present a reasonable mistake of age defense.110  The Gil-
mour Court reasoned: (1) the State of Iowa has a strong interest in
102. Id. at 540.  In so holding, the Court noted that social aversion to the content pro-
tected does not supersede the Court’s “duty as guardians of the Constitution.” Id. at 541.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Beezer argued that the Government’s interest in pro-
tecting the well-being of children outweighed any threat to freedom of expression. Id. at
546–47 (Beezer, J., dissenting).  Furthermore, he reasoned that judicially engrafting such a
defense would offer “little benefit at great cost.” Id.
103. Id. at 536 (majority opinion).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 538 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 540.  The Court further noted a pornographer does not always know the true
name of his actors. Id. at 540 n.2.  Acknowledging that document forgery is a big industry,
the Court suggested that forged documents may prohibit some pornographers from ascer-
taining the true age of their actors. Id.
108. Id. at 542.  Although the Court allowed for a reasonable mistake of age defense in
this context, the Court noted that this defense is “entirely implausible under most circum-
stances, particularly in cases involving children or prepubescent teenagers.” Id.  Further-
more, the Court noted that a defendant will certainly face significant difficulty convincing
a jury that he made his best effort to obtain the actor’s true age. Id. at 542–43.
109. 117 F.3d 368 (8th Cir. 1997).
110. Id. at 373.  Iowa Code § 728.12(1) states:
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preventing the sexual exploitation of children;111 (2) producers of
pornography have the opportunity to independently verify the age of
an actor;112 and (3) denying criminal defendants a reasonable mistake
of age defense would not substantially chill constitutionally protected
speech.113
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold wrote
that he would have found the state statute unconstitutional because it
does not allow for a criminal defendant to put forth a reasonable mis-
take of age defense.114  Judge Arnold disagreed with the majority’s
propositions, finding the following: (1) a properly designed reasona-
ble mistake of age defense would require defendants to investigate
actors’ ages and thus maintain the State’s interest in protecting the
well-being of children;115 (2) the court’s distinction between produc-
ers and distributors of pornography is legally insignificant;116 and,
most importantly, (3) the statute will substantially chill constitutionally
protected speech.117
It shall be unlawful to employ, use, persuade, induce, entice, coerce, solicit, know-
ingly permit, or otherwise cause or attempt to cause a minor to engage in a pro-
hibited sexual act or in the simulation of a prohibited sexual act.  A person must
know, or have reason to know, or intend that the act or simulated act may be
photographed, filmed, or otherwise preserved in a negative, slide, book, maga-
zine, computer, computer disk, or other print or visual medium . . . or in any
other type of storage system.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 728.12(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009).
111. Gilmour, 117 F.3d at 372.
112. Id. at 372–73.
113. Id. at 373.
114. Id. at 375 (Arnold, J., dissenting).  Judge Arnold additionally noted that the major-
ity’s holding failed to give pornographic media featuring adults the First Amendment pro-
tection it deserves. Id. at 373.
115. Id. at 374.
116. Id.  Specifically, Judge Arnold explained the majority wrongfully compared produc-
ers of pornography to statutory rapists in distinguishing them from pornography distribu-
tors. Id.  Judge Arnold stated that while there is no constitutional right to engage in
consensual sexual intercourse, there is a constitutional right to capture pornographic
images. Id.  Here, Judge Arnold emphasized that the First Amendment contains the most
extensive rights of any amendment in the Bill of Rights. Id.
In support of his claim that the court’s distinction between producers and distributors
of pornography is legally insignificant, Judge Arnold noted that in the information age, a
criminal defendant’s reasonable mistake of age defense to a § 728.12(1) charge “will
hardly ever prevail.” Id. Consequently, suggested Judge Arnold, the majority’s fear of the
consequences of allowing criminal defendants to present this defense fails completely. Id.
117. Id. at 375.  Judge Arnold emphasized that employing minors for sexual purposes
causes great public anxiety. Id.  Because of this great anxiety, he reasoned, individuals
accused of employing minors for sexual purposes are greatly stigmatized in society. Id.
Convictions for these crimes cause further hardships, as convicts must register as sex of-
fenders once released from prison. Id.  According to Judge Arnold, the severe conse-
quences of a § 2251(a) charge or conviction will inevitably cause pornography producers
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Most recently, in Deverso, the Eleventh Circuit similarly declined
to judicially engraft a constitutionally mandated reasonable mistake of
age defense for criminal defendants charged with violating Sec-
tion 2251(a).118  Swiftly rejecting the defendant’s constitutional argu-
ment for a reasonable mistake of age defense, the court cited Gilmour
as persuasive precedent and did not further justify its ruling.119
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In United States v. Malloy,120 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court’s conviction and sentencing of defendant Michael Malloy
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and held that Section 2251(a) does
not textually incorporate or constitutionally require a reasonable mis-
take of age defense.121  Writing for a unanimous Fourth Circuit, Judge
Allyson K. Duncan began the court’s analysis by examining Malloy’s
claim that the Constitution requires a reasonable mistake of age de-
fense.122  Examining the statutory text, legislative history, and prior
judicial interpretations of Section 2251(a), Judge Duncan concluded
that knowledge of the victim’s age is neither an enumerated element
of the offense nor textually included as an affirmative defense.123  In
this determination, Judge Duncan noted that it was “immediately ap-
parent” that Section 2251(a) does not require a defendant to have
known his victim was a minor to be convicted.124  Additionally, Judge
Duncan explained that the text of Section 2251(a) does not expressly
incorporate any affirmative defense.125
Justifying the court’s reading of the statute, Judge Duncan cited a
House Conference Report detailing that the Conference modified the
Senate’s original bill “ ‘with the intent that it is not a necessary ele-
ment of a prosecution that the defendant knew the actual age of the
to forfeit their First Amendment rights. Id.  Such forfeiture, said Judge Arnold, is the rea-
son courts should allow for a reasonable mistake of age defense. Id.
118. United States v. Deverso, 518 F.3d 1250, 1257–58 (11th Cir. 2008).
119. Id. at 1258.  The Court also cited United States v. Crow, 164 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 1999),
as precedent. Deverso, 518 F.3d at 1258.  In Crow, the defendant challenged the court’s jury
instruction regarding § 2251(a).  164 F.3d at 236.  Specifically, the defendant claimed that
the court failed to instruct the jury that he knew the girl he took obscene pictures of was a
minor. Id.  Here, the court held that knowledge is not an element of the § 2251(a) offense.
Id.
120. 568 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1736 (2010).
121. Id. at 171, 176.
122. Id. at 169, 171.
123. Id. at 171–72.
124. Id. at 171.
125. Id. at 172.
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child.’”126  Further supporting her conclusion that Section 2251(a)
does not textually enumerate knowledge of the victim’s age as an ele-
ment of the offense, Judge Duncan cited United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc.,127 in which the Supreme Court held that criminal defend-
ants may be convicted under Section 2251(a) without any showing
that they knew their victim’s actual age.128
Despite Malloy’s contention that a reasonable mistake of age de-
fense should be judicially engrafted into the statute to avoid chilling
constitutionally protected speech, Judge Duncan cited three sister cir-
cuit decisions and the United States Supreme Court to bolster the
court’s argument that a reasonable mistake of age defense is not con-
stitutionally required.129  The Fourth Circuit further noted,
“‘[A]ccording to our First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, a stat-
ute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected
speech.’”130  The court concluded, however, that the government in-
terest in prohibiting child participation in pornography greatly out-
weighed the danger of chilling speech that would otherwise be
protected by the First Amendment.131
Judge Duncan similarly reasoned that refusing to allow Malloy a
mistake of age defense did not violate his due process rights.132  Al-
though Malloy argued that the disallowance of a reasonable mistake
of age defense violated his due process right to present a defense, the
Fourth Circuit determined that the district court had provided Malloy
with ample opportunity to present a defense.133  Because the core of
Malloy’s due process complaint stemmed from his inability to present
a particular defense (that is, reasonable mistake of age), the court also
considered Malloy’s contention as an evidentiary argument.134  Ex-
plaining that “ ‘a defendant’s right to present a defense is not abso-
126. Id. at 171 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-811, at 5 (1977) (Conf. Rep.)).
127. 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
128. Malloy, 568 F.3d at 171–72 (citing X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 77 n.5).
129. Id. at 172–76.
130. Id. at 174 (quoting United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1838 (2008)).
131. Id. at 176.  In support of this conclusion, Judge Duncan noted that because the
Government has a serious interest in protecting children, the Government has more au-
thority to regulate child pornography than it does other industries. Id. at 174–75.  Alterna-
tively, Judge Duncan noted that little lawful pornography would be chilled by the lack of a
reasonable mistake of age defense because pornography producers are legally required to
confirm their actors’ ages. Id. at 175–76.
132. Id. at 176–77.
133. Id. Specifically, the court cited to the fact that the court permitted Malloy to pre-
sent evidence attempting to disprove that S.G. was a minor at the time Malloy made the
tape. Id.
134. Id. at 177.
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lute,’”135 and that the evidence Malloy wished to present was
irrelevant to the crime with which he was charged, the Fourth Circuit
rejected any such evidentiary argument Malloy might raise.136
The Fourth Circuit subsequently determined that Malloy’s indict-
ment, which had included a knowledge element, was not construc-
tively amended with his conviction.137  Concluding that the record did
not demonstrate any evidence of prejudice to Malloy’s defense, Judge
Duncan asserted that Malloy was appropriately tried for the crime with
which he was charged.138  Consequently, the court held that the word
“knowingly” in Malloy’s indictment had no prejudicial effect on his
trial.139
Judge Duncan next established that the Commerce Clause em-
powers Congress to regulate child pornography under Sec-
tion 2251(a).140  Citing United States v. Forrest,141 the court explained
that it had previously upheld a defendant’s conviction for producing
child pornography in which the product had never crossed state lines
but the equipment used for its production had.142  Although Malloy’s
production of the tape in question was undoubtedly a local produc-
tion of child pornography, the court reasoned, he produced the video
with a foreign camera and foreign videotape.143  Consequently, the
court concluded that Malloy’s production constituted an activity hav-
ing a substantial effect on interstate commerce.144
Finally, the Fourth Circuit determined that Malloy’s fifteen-year
sentence did not violate his Eighth Amendment protection from cruel
and unusual punishment.145  Explaining that judicial review of an
Eighth Amendment challenge in the Fourth Circuit is unavailable for
sentences less than life imprisonment without the possibility of parole,
the court held that Malloy’s sentence was constitutional.146
135. Id. (quoting United States v. Prince-Oyibo, 320 F.3d 494, 501 (4th Cir. 2003)).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 177–79.
138. Id. at 178–79.
139. Id. at 179.
140. Id. at 179–80.
141. 429 F.3d 73 (4th Cir. 2005).
142. Malloy, 568 F.3d at 179 (citing Forrest, 429 F.3d at 78–79).  Significantly, the Malloy
court noted that “the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate purely local intra-
state activities, so long as they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce.” Id. (citing Forrest, 429 F.3d at 78 (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
143. Id. at 180.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
In United States v. Malloy, the Fourth Circuit held the following:
(1) knowledge of the victim’s age is not an element of a 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(a) offense, nor is it textually available to criminal defendants
as an affirmative defense;147 and (2) the United States Constitution
does not require judicial engraftment of a reasonable mistake of age
affirmative defense.148  In so holding, the Fourth Circuit correctly de-
termined that Section 2251(a) does not enumerate knowledge as an
element of the offense,149 nor does its text permit a criminal defen-
dant to raise reasonable mistake of age as an affirmative defense.150
With its ruling, however, the Malloy court neglected to recognize the
narrow instance in which a reasonable mistake of age defense could
be constitutionally available to criminal defendants charged with Sec-
tion 2251(a) crimes, first by mischaracterizing the circuit split on this
issue151 and subsequently by failing to properly balance competing so-
cial interests.152  The court could have reached the same outcome and
successfully protected children from exploitive abuse in the pornogra-
phy industry without completely denying criminal defendants’ ability
to raise a reasonable mistake of age defense in Section 2251(a)
cases.153  Furthermore, when the Malloy court neglected to carve out a
narrow reasonable mistake of age defense for pornography producers,
it set the stage to chill future constitutionally protected speech.154
A. Carefully Following Child Pornography Precedent, the Malloy Court
Properly Concluded that the Text, Legislative History, and
Recent Judicial Interpretations of Section 2251(a)
Disregard the Relevance of Knowledge of a Victim’s
Age
In upholding Malloy’s conviction, the Fourth Circuit appropri-
ately analyzed the statutory text, legislative history, and recent judicial
interpretations of Section 2251(a).  The court correctly concluded
that knowledge of the victim’s age is not an enumerated element of
the offense.155  Similarly, the court correctly concluded that knowl-
147. Id. at 171.
148. Id. at 176.
149. See infra Part IV.A.1.
150. See infra Part IV.A.2.
151. See infra Part IV.B.1.
152. See infra Part IV.B.2.
153. See infra Part IV.C.1.
154. See infra Part IV.C.2.
155. See infra Part IV.A.1.
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edge of the victim’s age is not textually available to criminal defend-
ants as an affirmative defense.156  Although the rule of lenity would
have enabled the court to interpret the text of Section 2251(a) to al-
low criminal defendants to present a reasonable mistake of age de-
fense, the Malloy court appropriately interpreted the statute using
expressio unius reasoning and following recent precedent.157  Because
sex crimes, particularly those involving minors, are generally recog-
nized as an exception to the rule of lenity, the Malloy court’s decision
to utilize expressio unius reasoning in interpreting the text of Sec-
tion 2251(a) was proper.158
1. The Fourth Circuit Correctly Held that Knowledge of the Victim’s
Age Is Not an Element of a Section 2251(a) Offense
The Malloy court correctly relied on the text, legislative history,
and recent judicial interpretations of Section 2251(a) in determining
that knowledge of the victim’s age is not an element of this statute.  In
doing so, the Fourth Circuit correctly found that the most grammati-
cal reading of this statute does not include knowledge of the victim’s
age as a necessary element of the offense.159  Specifically, the Malloy
court noted that a Section 2251(a) charge of sexual exploitation of a
minor for the purpose of production of a visual depiction includes
only three elements, none of which requires knowledge of the victim’s
age.160  Due to the gravity of Malloy’s constitutional challenge, moreo-
ver, the court properly determined that its statutory inquiry necessi-
tated a more comprehensive analysis of both the legislative history and
recent judicial interpretations of this statute.161
156. See infra Part IV.A.2.
157. See infra notes 171–76 and accompanying text. R
158. See infra notes 174–76 and accompanying text. R
159. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009) (failing to enumerate knowl-
edge of the victim’s age as an element of the offense); United States v. Malloy, 568 F.3d
166, 171 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1736 (2010) (concluding that knowledge of
the victim’s age is not an element of a § 2251(a) offense).
160. Malloy, 568 F.3d at 169.  The Fourth Circuit concluded that the three elements of a
§ 2251(a) charge include as follows:
(1) the victim was less than 18 years old; (2) the defendant used, employed, per-
suaded, induced, enticed, or coerced the minor to take part in sexually explicit
conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of that conduct; and (3)
the visual depiction was produced using materials that had been transported in
interstate or foreign commerce.
Id.
161. See id. at 171 (addressing the statutory text prior to specifically addressing Malloy’s
constitutional challenge); United States v. Deverso, 518 F.3d 1250, 1257–58 (11th Cir.
2008) (first considering whether knowledge of the victim’s age is an element of a § 2251(a)
offense before addressing the defendant’s constitutional claim).
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In support of its holding, the court properly determined that the
legislative history of Section 2251(a) reveals that Congress did not in-
tend for knowledge to be an element of this offense. The Fourth Cir-
cuit aptly noted that in enacting Section 2251(a), Congress expressly
rejected the notion that the statute should include knowledge of the
victim’s age as an element of the offense.162  Quoting the relevant por-
tion of the House Conference Report, the Fourth Circuit detailed:
The Senate Bill contains an express requirement in pro-
posed section 2251(a) that the crime be committed “know-
ingly.”  The House amendment does not.  The Conference
substitute accepts the House provision with the intent that it is
not a necessary element of a prosecution that the defendant knew the
actual age of the child.163
Thus, despite the inclusion of the word “knowingly” in Malloy’s indict-
ment, the court’s use of the legislative history of Section 2251(a) dem-
onstrates the superfluity of this language.164
The Fourth Circuit’s subsequent reliance on the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.165 illuminated
an identical judicial understanding of the elements of the Sec-
tion 2251(a) offense.  Because X-Citement Video provided that produc-
ers of pornography are in an easy position to determine the age of
their performers and that a Section 2251(a) offense is similar to statu-
tory rape,166 the Malloy court properly relied on X-Citement Video as a
recent judicial interpretation of this statute.167  Consequently, the
court’s thorough analysis of Section 2251(a) jurisprudence supports
its finding that knowledge is not an element of the Section 2251(a)
offense.
162. See Malloy, 568 F.3d at 171 (analyzing the legislative intent in creating the elements
of a § 2251(a) offense).
163. See id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-811, at 5 (1977) (Conf. Rep.)); cf. United States v.
U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (District Court), 858 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 1988)
(determining that the drafters of § 2251(a) did not intend to require the prosecution to
prove that the defendant knew the victim’s age).
164. See Malloy, 568 F.3d at 171–72 (detailing the legislative history of § 2251(a) and
concluding that knowledge is not an element of the offense).
165. 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
166. Id. at 72–77.
167. See Malloy, 568 F.3d at 171–72 (bolstering its claim that § 2251(a) does not include
knowledge of the victim’s age by using Supreme Court precedent).  The Fourth Circuit’s
reliance on X-Citement Video, however, does not specifically answer Malloy’s constitutional
challenge of this statute; although the Malloy court later specifically addressed Malloy’s
constitutional challenge, it did not make any mention of the constitutionality of § 2251(a)
in its reliance of X-Citement Video as precedent for interpreting the text of this statute. See
id. (considering the constitutional challenge subsequent to the textual analysis).
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2. The Malloy Court Followed Sister Circuit Precedent in Neglecting
to Interpret the Text of Section 2251(a) to Include a
Reasonable Mistake of Age Defense
Including significantly less detail than it did in its analysis of
whether knowledge was an element of the Section 2251(a) offense,
the Fourth Circuit similarly examined the text of Section 2251(a) to
find that the statute on its face does not allow a criminal defendant to
present a reasonable mistake of age defense.  Citing the relevant statu-
tory language, the Malloy court properly implied that such a defense is
not enumerated in the statute.168  Utilizing the statutory interpreta-
tion canon of expressio unius, the court determined that because Sec-
tion 2251(a) does not contain such an enumerated affirmative
defense, Congress did not intend for one to be present.169  To bolster
its use of expressio unius reasoning in finding that Congress did not
intend for this statute to allow defendants to present a reasonable mis-
take of age defense, the court analogized 18 U.S.C. §§ 2243(c) and
2252A(d), which both explicitly contain enumerated affirmative de-
fenses, to Section 2251(a), which does not textually include any af-
firmative defenses.170
Moreover, in concluding that Section 2251(a) does not textually
allow criminal defendants to present a reasonable mistake of age de-
fense at trial, the court appropriately utilized expressio unius reasoning
as opposed to the rule of lenity.171  Had the Malloy court interpreted
Section 2251(a) by using the rule of lenity, it could have held that the
textual ambiguity of the statute should be resolved in Malloy’s favor
and thus that he should have been permitted to present a reasonable
mistake of age defense.172  The court’s use of expressio unius reasoning
168. See id. (explicitly noting that § 2251(a) lacks an affirmative reasonable mistake of
age defense).
169. Id.; see also Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989) (explaining
that the Supreme Court “must . . . be governed by the text” and “where the text is clear . . .
we have no power to insert an amendment”); 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 65, § 47:23
(explaining that expressio unius reasoning assumes that “all omissions . . . be understood as
exclusions”).
170. See Malloy, 568 F.3d at 172 (comparing § 2251(a) to §§ 2243(c) and 2252A(d)); see
also supra note 20 and accompanying text (providing the text of § 2251(a), which does not R
enumerate any affirmative defenses that may be raised in response to being charged under
this statute).
171. See 2 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 65, § 44A:19 (explaining that the rule of lenity is
used to interpret ambiguous criminal statutes).
172. See id. (clarifying that ambiguous criminal statutes should be resolved under the
rule of lenity in favor of the criminal defendant); see also Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952) (pronouncing that one of the primary justifications for the
rule of lenity is to “give notice of the required conduct to one who would avoid its
penalties”).
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in its interpretation of Section 2251(a), however, follows Eleventh Cir-
cuit precedent in United States v. Deverso.173  Because sex crimes, in-
cluding child rape, have previously been recognized as an exception
to crimes where a knowledge requirement should be read into a crim-
inal statute, the rule of lenity is not the most appropriate tool for in-
terpretation of statutes criminalizing sex offenses, particularly those
involving children.174  Therefore, although the Malloy court did not
cite a specific precedent in its determination that Section 2251(a)
does not allow for a reasonable mistake of age defense,175 it nonethe-
less appropriately followed the correct approach of recent precedent
in refusing to apply the rule of lenity in interpreting Sec-
tion 2251(a).176  Concluding that the text of Section 2251(a) does not
include knowledge of the victim’s age as an element of the offense or
reasonable mistake of age as an affirmative defense, the Malloy court
was prepared to consider Malloy’s First Amendment challenge.177
B. The Fourth Circuit Should Have Judicially Engrafted a Reasonable
Mistake of Age Defense Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine
After correctly determining that the statutory text, legislative his-
tory, and recent jurisprudence of Section 2251(a) do not require the
Government to prove the defendant’s knowledge of his victim’s age or
allow for a reasonable mistake of age defense,178 the court failed to
judicially engraft a reasonable mistake of age defense.179  In doing so,
the Fourth Circuit wrongfully characterized the Section 2251(a) cir-
cuit split, relying too heavily on the Gilmour majority’s overbreadth
analysis.180  Furthermore, the Malloy court misbalanced the social in-
173. See 518 F.3d 1250, 1257 (11th Cir. 2008) (utilizing expressio unius reasoning in hold-
ing that defendant Deverso was not entitled to a reasonable mistake of age jury instruction
because knowledge of age is not an element of the offense).
174. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 n.8 (1952) (explaining that sex
offenses are an exception to the general rule that a knowledge requirement should be read
into an ambiguous criminal statute). But cf. Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of
Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 909 (2004) (“If the notice theory is insufficient to justify
the application of lenity across the gamut of crimes, there appears to be little authority to
support selective application of the rule to some crimes but not others.”).
175. See Malloy, 568 F.3d at 172 (neglecting to cite to any specific case law in its determi-
nation of whether § 2251(a) textually enables criminal defendants to present a reasonable
mistake of age defense).
176. See Deverso, 518 F.3d at 1257 (holding that § 2251(a) does not textually enable crim-
inal defendants to present a reasonable mistake of age defense).
177. Malloy, 568 F.3d at 172.
178. See supra Part IV.A.1–2.
179. See infra Part IV.B.1–2.
180. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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terests at stake in its decision not to judicially engraft a reasonable
mistake of age defense.181
1. The Court Mischaracterized the Section 2251(a) Overbreadth
Circuit Split in Rejecting the Reasonable Mistake of Age
Defense
The Fourth Circuit’s mischaracterization of the circuit split fos-
tered its failure to judicially engraft a reasonable mistake of age de-
fense.  Specifically, the Fourth Circuit too easily dismissed the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis of the reasonable mistake of age defense in District
Court.182  Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit improperly relied on the
Eighth Circuit’s conclusion in Gilmour as its primary support to reject
the reasonable mistake of age defense.183  Additionally, the Malloy
court’s reliance on the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning offered little sup-
port for its denial of the reasonable mistake of age defense.184
First, the Fourth Circuit wrongfully dismissed the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning in District Court in declining to engraft a reasonable mistake
of age defense.  The Malloy court initially attempted to discredit the
Ninth Circuit’s judicial engraftment of a reasonable mistake of age
defense by noting that District Court predates the Supreme Court’s
opinion in X-Citement Video.185  This preliminary attempt to discredit
the Ninth Circuit fails, however, because the primary issue in X-Cite-
ment Video was whether 18 U.S.C. § 2252 required knowledge of the
victim’s age to be an element—not an affirmative defense—of the stat-
ute.186  Because the central issue in District Court differs from that of X-
Citement Video, the Malloy court’s dismissal of the District Court reason-
ing lacks merit.187  Moreover, rather than dismissing the District Court
181. See infra Part IV.B.2.
182. See infra notes 185–92 and accompanying text. R
183. See infra notes 193–202 and accompanying text. R
184. See infra note 203 and accompanying text. R
185. See United States v. Malloy, 568 F.3d 166, 173 & n.2 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that
the Ninth Circuit decided District Court before the Supreme Court decided X-Citement Video,
and, additionally, attempting to differentiate Malloy’s situation from the precedent set
forth in District Court), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1736 (2010).
186. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 65–67 (1994) (detailing
defendant Rubin Gottesman’s claim that the Protection of Children Against Sexual Ex-
ploitation Act was unconstitutional because it does not require the Government to prove
that the defendant knew his victim was a minor).
187. See id. (considering whether § 2252 was unconstitutional because it lacked a reason-
able mistake of age defense); United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal.
(District Court), 858 F.2d 534, 538–42 (9th Cir. 1988) (determining that § 2251(a) is uncon-
stitutional because it does not allow criminal defendants to present a reasonable mistake of
age defense); see also Gilmour v. Rogerson, 117 F.3d 368, 372 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that
after the Supreme Court’s ruling in X-Citement Video, the issue of whether § 2251(a) consti-
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analysis in this way, the Fourth Circuit should have at least considered
the reasons the Ninth Circuit provided for adopting a reasonable mis-
take of age defense in District Court.188
The Malloy court also wrongfully dismissed the holding in District
Court by noting that the affirmative defense the Ninth Circuit adopted
was “very narrow.”189  The fact that this defense is narrow, however, is
not enough to discredit it.190  As the majority in District Court deter-
mined, Section 2251(a) would “seriously chill protected speech” with-
out a reasonable mistake of age defense.191  Therefore, the Malloy
court’s assertion that the reasonable mistake of age defense that Dis-
trict Court adopted was “very narrow” merely shows that a broad rea-
sonable mistake of age defense was not necessary.192  Consequently,
neither of the Malloy court’s overt attempts to discredit the District
Court analysis justified its ultimate conclusion that Section 2251(a)
does not constitutionally require a reasonable mistake of age defense.
Second, in declining to judicially engraft an affirmative defense,
the Fourth Circuit relied too heavily on the Eighth Circuit’s analysis of
Section 2251(a).  Explaining its decision not to allow the defense, the
Malloy court pointed to the Eighth Circuit’s determination that crimi-
nal statutes protecting children often do not require a mens rea ele-
ment.193  The Malloy court also cited Gilmour v. Rogerson194 as rejecting
the approach taken in District Court.195  The Fourth Circuit’s heavy re-
liance on the Eighth Circuit’s assertion that criminal statutes intended
tutionally mandated a mistake of age defense was unclear everywhere except in the Ninth
Circuit).
188. See District Court, 858 F.2d at 540 (explaining that the First Amendment does not
allow strict liability to be imposed when doing so would “seriously chill” constitutionally
protected speech).
189. See Malloy, 568 F.3d at 173 n.2 (quoting District Court’s holding: “A defendant may
avoid conviction only by showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that he did not know,
and could not reasonably have learned, that the actor or actress was under 18 years of age.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
190. Cf. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 188–89 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 may unconstitutionally pose an un-
due burden on a small percentage of women seeking abortions and consequently noting
that “[t]he very purpose of a[n] . . . exception is to protect women in exceptional cases”).  The
Gonzales Court’s notion of an exception as necessary to protect women is similar to the
Ninth Circuit’s attempt to protect speech with the narrow exception it set forth in District
Court.
191. District Court, 858 F.2d at 540.
192. See Malloy, 568 F.3d at 173 n.2 (attempting to discredit the defense set forth in
District Court).
193. See id. at 173–74 (citing the Eighth Circuit precedent set in Gilmour to rule that
§ 2251(a) does not constitutionally require a reasonable mistake of age defense).
194. 117 F.3d 368 (8th Cir. 1997).
195. Malloy, 568 F.3d at 174 (citing Gilmour, 117 F.3d at 372).
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to protect children do not require a mens rea element does not con-
clusively support the position that Section 2251(a) does not require a
reasonable mistake of age defense.196
Furthermore, the Malloy court should not have chiefly relied on
the Gilmour majority’s reasoning in determining that Section 2251(a)
does not require a reasonable mistake of age defense.197  First, be-
cause the Supreme Court has held, in the administrative law context,
that legislative inaction following interpretation of a statute evidences
the legislature’s intention to adopt the interpretation,198 the legisla-
ture’s inaction following the Ninth Circuit’s decision in District Court
evidences Congress’s intent to adopt the reasonable mistake of age
defense set forth in District Court.199  Second, although the statute at
196. Compare id. (choosing to follow the Eighth Circuit precedent set forth in Gilmour
despite the fact that the Ninth Circuit previously ruled in District Court that § 2251(a) con-
stitutionally requires judicial engraftment of a reasonable mistake of age defense), with
District Court, 858 F.2d at 542–44 (explaining that “the federal courts may, in limited cir-
cumstances, recognize an affirmative defense where a statute does not expressly provide it”
and holding that § 2251(a) constitutionally requires a narrow reasonable mistake of age
defense).
197. See Malloy, 568 F.3d at 174 (primarily utilizing the Gilmour court’s analysis in re-
jecting to engraft a reasonable mistake of age defense).
198. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 383–85 (1981) (holding that because Con-
gress had been made aware of the FCC’s interpretation of a provision of the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act of 1973, “departure from that construction is unwarranted”); Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965) (“Congress’ failure to repeal or revise [the statute] in the face
of such administrative interpretation [is] persuasive evidence that that interpretation is the
one intended by Congress.”).  Because courts have sometimes considered the “legislative
inaction following contemporaneous and practical interpretation” rule a “‘weak reed upon
which to lean’” and a “‘poor beacon to follow,’” 2B SINGER & SINGER, supra note 65, R
§ 49:10, application of this rule may require “the inference of conscious ratification,’”
Duncan v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 375 F.2d 915, 919 (4th Cir. 1967).  Moreover, this rule is an
appropriate interpretive tool to use in this circumstance for two reasons.  First, Congress
has revised § 2251 nine times since the Ninth Circuit’s judicial engraftment of a reasonable
mistake of age defense in District Court and has never revised the statute to prevent courts
from judicially engrafting this defense. See infra note 199 and accompanying text (enumer- R
ating the nine times Congress has revised § 2251 without ever addressing the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s ruling in District Court).  Second, because child pornography and child prostitution
are serious issues that have raised great concern in Congress, it would seem that Congress
would have revised § 2251 following District Court if it did not wish to adopt this interpreta-
tion. See S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 8–9 (1977) (detailing the need to enact § 2251 because of
the importance of prohibiting child pornography and child prostitution in American soci-
ety).  Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit’s refusal to judicially engraft a reasonable mistake of
age defense and Congress’s subsequent inaction following that decision does not consti-
tute legislative inaction following contemporaneous and practical interpretation because
the Eighth Circuit interpreted a state child pornography statute in its decision in Gilmour.
See Gilmour, 117 F.3d at 370 (interpreting Iowa Code § 728.12(1)).
199. Congress amended § 2251 nine times after District Court and failed to change any of
the relevant language of the statute following the Ninth Circuit’s judicial engraftment of a
reasonable mistake of age defense.  See Providing Resources, Officers, and Technology to
Eradicate Cyber Threats to Our Children Act of 2008 (Protect Our Children Act of 2008),
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issue in Gilmour is analogous to Section 2251(a), the Gilmour court
analyzed an Iowa statute—Iowa Code Section 728.12(1)—and deter-
mined that it does not require a reasonable mistake of age defense.200
Interpretation of a federal statute should only be based on a state stat-
ute when the federal statute was borrowed from the state statute.201
Rather than primarily basing its reasoning on Gilmour, therefore, the
Fourth Circuit should have given more meaningful consideration to
other cases, District Court in particular, that specifically discussed
Section 2251(a).202
Finally, the Malloy court’s reliance on the Eleventh Circuit’s hold-
ing in Deverso offers little support to justify its conclusion.  Although
the Eleventh Circuit ultimately determined that Section 2251(a) does
not constitutionally require a reasonable mistake of age defense, the
Eleventh Circuit only cited two cases—one of which was Gilmour—in
reaching its conclusion.203  The Fourth Circuit’s use of Deverso, there-
Pub. L. No. 110-401, tit. III, § 301, 122 Stat. 4242; Effective Child Pornography Prosecution
Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, tit. I, § 103(a)(1), 122 Stat. 4002; Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, tit. II, § 206(b)(1), 120 Stat. 614;
Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003
(PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, tit. I, § 103(a)(1)(A), (b)(1)(A), tit. V, § 506, 117
Stat. 652, 683; Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
314, tit. II, § 201, 112 Stat. 2977; Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, div. A, tit. I, § 101(a) [tit. I, § 121, subsec. 4], 110 Stat. 3009–30; Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. VI, § 60011, tit. XVI,
§ 160001, tit. XXXIII, § 330016(1)(T), 108 Stat. 1973, 2037, 2148; Crime Control Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, tit. III, § 3563, 104 Stat. 4928; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-690, tit. VII, § 7511(a), 102 Stat. 4485.
200. See Gilmour, 117 F.3d at 370 (considering whether the defendant’s conviction under
Iowa Code § 728.12(1) should stand); supra note 110 (quoting the language of R
§ 728.12(1)).
201. See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 581 (1994) (noting that the “‘general
rule [is] that adoption of the wording of a statute from another legislative jurisdiction
carries with it the previous judicial interpretations of the wording’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 26 (1944))); 2B SINGER &
SINGER, supra note 65, § 52:1 (“The fact that a statute of another state is similar and also has R
a similar legislative history to that of the statute being construed furnishes added reason to
consider it relevant for interpretive purposes.”); see also Stutsman County v. Wallace, 142
U.S. 293, 312 (1891) (holding that analogous statutes from Iowa and Nebraska “were so
different from that involved here, as to deprive the decisions of the weight which might
justly be ascribed to them if they had argued and disposed of the precise question before
[the Court]”).
202. See Malloy, 568 F.3d at 173–75 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit approach, relying on the
Eighth Circuit’s approach in Gilmour, and merely mentioning the Eleventh Circuit’s
stance).
203. See United States v. Deverso, 518 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Gilmour,
117 F.3d at 370–73, and United States v. Crow, 164 F.3d 229, 236 (5th Cir. 1999)—Crow only
considered whether knowledge was an element of the § 2251(a) offense and did not con-
sider an affirmative defense—in support of its conclusion that the defendant should not be
able to raise a reasonable mistake of age defense).  In justifying its conclusion, the Deverso
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fore, amounted to little more than empty precedent.  Accordingly, al-
though two of the three sister circuit precedents cited in Malloy ruled
the same way, the Malloy court failed to utilize Gilmour or Deverso in a
meaningful way as to justify its rejection of a reasonable mistake of age
defense, and also failed to discredit the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the
issue in District Court.
2. The Malloy Court Did Not Properly Balance Competing Social
Interests in Its Overbreadth Analysis
In addition to failing to properly utilize sister circuit precedent,
the Fourth Circuit neglected to properly balance competing social in-
terests in its independent overbreadth analysis.  On the first side of
the scale, the court properly concluded that the Government has a
great interest in protecting the well-being of children.204  On the
other side of the scale, however, the court wrongfully minimized the
chilling effect of denying criminal defendants a reasonable mistake of
age defense on their constitutional right to free speech.205  The
court’s imbalanced scale wrongfully denies criminal defendants in the
Fourth Circuit a reasonable mistake of age defense.
In its overbreadth analysis, the Fourth Circuit first determined
that the Government has significant freedom to regulate the produc-
tion of child pornography because of the great importance of protect-
ing the well-being of children.206  Indeed, the well-being of children
has always been a serious consideration in the regulation of child por-
nography.207  In response to an overbreadth challenge, however, a
court must properly weigh the State’s social welfare interests against
the potential chilling effect of constitutionally protected speech.208
court merely stated, “We reject Deverso’s contention and hold that the Constitution does
not mandate a mistake of age defense under § 2251.” Deverso, 518 F.3d at 1258.  The court
did not discuss this issue further. See id.
204. See infra notes 206–08 and accompanying text. R
205. See infra notes 209–13 and accompanying text. R
206. See Malloy, 568 F.3d at 175 (“‘Like obscenity statutes, laws directed at the dissemina-
tion of child pornography run the risk of suppressing protected expression by allowing the
hand of the censor to become unduly heavy . . . .  [H]owever, we are persuaded that the
States are entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of chil-
dren.’” (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982))).
207. See, e.g., Gilmour, 117 F.3d at 372 (noting that the State’s interest in prohibiting the
sexual exploitation of minors is “very strong”); cf. GORDON HAWKINS & FRANKLIN E. ZIMR-
ING, PORNOGRAPHY IN A FREE SOCIETY 179 (1988) (explaining that “[n]o mainstream com-
mentary we have seen takes exception to prohibiting the use of children in the production
of commercial, or for that matter private, pornography; or to the use of the criminal law to
enforce that prohibition”).
208. See supra Part II.B.
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The Malloy court failed to properly balance the chilling effect of
constitutionally protected speech.  Initially, the court minimized Sec-
tion 2251(a)’s potential chilling effect, primarily basing its reasoning
on a wrongful determination that little legitimate pornography would
be chilled by the decision not to recognize a reasonable mistake of
age defense because pornography producers are already required to
authenticate their actors’ ages.209  This argument misses the point,
however, because it fails to consider the severity of the potential strict
liability sanctions facing criminal defendants charged with Sec-
tion 2251(a) violations.210  Even though pornography producers are
required to determine the age of their actors prior to commencing
production, there are circumstances in which pornography produc-
ers, despite their best efforts, are unable to uncover the true age of
their actors.211  The Fourth Circuit fails to note that this is precisely
what happened to the defendant in District Court.212  Without a reason-
able mistake of age defense, therefore, pornography producers will
inevitably forfeit their First Amendment rights for fear of severe strict
liability sanctions being imposed.213
The Malloy court’s subsequent auxiliary reasons for determining
that Section 2251(a) will not chill constitutionally protected speech
are equally flawed.  The court’s conclusion that only pornography fea-
209. See Malloy, 568 F.3d at 175 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2257(b)(1), the statutory provision
requiring pornography producers to “‘ascertain, by examination of an identification docu-
ment containing such information, the performer’s name and date of birth’”).
210. See Gilmour, 117 F.3d at 375 (Arnold, J., dissenting) (explaining that the court’s
denial of criminal defendants’ ability to present a reasonable mistake of age defense will
inevitably chill speech).  Judge Arnold wrote:
A conviction for a crime like the one charged here, moreover, will almost cer-
tainly cause significant hardship by depriving those convicted of their liberty for a
considerable period of time and by creating lasting difficulties for them because
of laws that require them to register with local authorities following release.
These kinds of burdensome disabilities will surely cause many producers of pro-
tected erotic matter to forfeit their First Amendment rights, and this is precisely
the kind of forfeiture that courts ought to be assiduous to give citizens the means
to avoid.
Id.
211. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (District Court), 858
F.2d 534, 540 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that “[t]here is no way of being absolutely sure that
an actor or actress who is youthful in appearance is not a minor”).
212. See Malloy, 568 F.3d at 172–76 (failing to acknowledge that pornography producers
charged with § 2251 offenses have previously been unable to determine the true age of
their actors, despite their best attempts); cf. District Court, 858 F.2d at 536 (describing how
defendants were “seriously misled” as to the true age of an actress that appeared in their
film).
213. See Gilmour, 117 F.3d at 375 (arguing that failing to allow for a reasonable mistake
of age defense will seriously chill future speech).
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turing “youthful actors” will be chilled214 does not refute an over-
breadth argument because it fails to demonstrate that a substantial
amount of speech will not be chilled.215  Similarly, the court’s conclu-
sion that most prosecutions involve subjects that are unmistakably
children also fails to overcome an overbreadth challenge.216  Al-
though the court argued that prosecution of “youthful-looking sub-
jects who are not unmistakably children” is rare,217 it overlooks the
fact that this was precisely what occurred in two of the three major
precedents on this issue.218  The factual circumstance of District Court
may chill constitutionally protected speech, despite the Malloy court’s
assertion that such prosecutions are infrequent.
Finally, the court’s assertion that producers of pornography fea-
turing youthful-looking actors will not be chilled because pornogra-
phy is lucrative219 does not justify denying Malloy’s overbreadth
challenge.  Although pornography may be a lucrative industry, its pro-
ducers nonetheless risk prosecution for utilizing a minor actor and, if
214. See Malloy, 568 F.3d at 175–76 (arguing that only a “subset” of pornography is at
issue without any affirmative evidence that pornography featuring “youthful-looking” ac-
tors constitutes a small enough portion of constitutionally protected speech to trump an
overbreadth challenge (internal quotation marks omitted)).
215. See CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND SEX RINGS 30 (Ann Wolbert Burgess & Marieanne
Lindeqvist Clark eds., 1984) (clarifying that “[i]t has been difficult to obtain statistics on
the use, sale, or possession of child pornography because the dynamics of child sexual
exploitation include secrecy and pressure by the adult to ensure the child’s loyalty not to
disclose any information about sexual activity”); HAWKINS & ZIMRING, supra note 207, at 182 R
(hypothesizing that because pornography featuring children is an uncontroversial topic in
our society, it has never been rigorously studied or analyzed and that consequently “a con-
siderable number of general statements float on top of an abundance of unexamined is-
sues relating to the possible harms involved in children’s participation in the production of
pornographic material”); Porn Profits: Corporate America’s Secret, ABC NEWS, May 27, 2004,
http://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/story?id=132370&page=1 (explaining that pornogra-
phy is a $10 billion business in the United States, making it bigger than the National Foot-
ball League, the National Basketball Association, and Major League Baseball combined).
216. See Malloy, 568 F.3d at 176 (noting that child pornography victims frequently can-
not be found, and, consequently, when prosecutors must prove their case on images alone,
prosecutions only occur when the victim is “unmistakably a child”).
217. Id.; see also District Court, 858 F.2d at 546 (Beezer, J., dissenting) (arguing that prose-
cution in such cases does not frequently occur).
218. See United States v. Deverso, 518 F.3d 1250, 1253–54 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining
that one of the defendant’s victims, “Beverly,” was seventeen when the defendant captured
pornographic images of her); Gilmour, 117 F.3d at 369–70 (majority opinion) (prosecuting
a criminal defendant who took photographs of a seventeen-year-old who claimed to be
twenty-two); District Court, 858 F.2d at 536 (majority opinion) (prosecuting a criminal de-
fendant for hiring a youthful-looking actress to play in the pornography film Those Young
Girls).
219. See Malloy, 568 F.3d at 176 & n.8 (justifying its conclusion that pornography is lucra-
tive by citing two articles that explain that pornography is currently a multi-billion dollar
industry in the United States).
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convicted, face severe sanctions.220  Thus, all of the court’s justifica-
tions for denying Malloy’s overbreadth challenge fail.
C. The Malloy Court’s Holding Unnecessarily Sets the Stage to Chill
Future Constitutionally Protected Speech
Because the Fourth Circuit, in declining to adopt a reasonable
mistake of age defense, wrongfully utilized sister circuit precedent and
failed to properly balance competing social interests and prevent over-
breadth,221 future constitutionally protected speech will be chilled in
this circuit.  Moreover, the Fourth Circuit could easily have engrafted
a reasonable mistake of age defense to prevent overbreadth and up-
held Malloy’s conviction.222  Through faulty reasoning, however, the
Fourth Circuit’s absolute refusal to engraft a reasonable mistake of
age defense for criminal defendants charged with violating Sec-
tion 2251(a) set the stage to chill constitutionally protected speech in
the future.223
1. The Fourth Circuit Could Have Reached the Same Outcome
Without an Absolute Determination that a Reasonable
Mistake of Age Defense Is Never Appropriate
If the Malloy court had elected to judicially engraft an affirmative
defense to Section 2251(a), it still could have upheld Malloy’s convic-
tion.  As the court noted, the Ninth Circuit adopted a narrow affirma-
tive defense to Section 2251(a) in District Court: “A defendant may
avoid conviction only by showing, by clear and convincing evidence,
that he did not know, and could not reasonably have learned, that the
actor or actress was under 18 years of age.”224  Because the defendant
in District Court could show by clear and convincing evidence that
there was absolutely no way he could have learned the true age of the
actress in question, the Ninth Circuit permitted him to present this
affirmative defense.225  The Malloy court noted, though, that the af-
220. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. R
221. See supra Part IV.B.1–2.
222. See infra Part IV.C.1.
223. See infra Part IV.C.2.
224. Malloy, 568 F.3d at 173 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (District Court), 858 F.2d 534, 543 (9th Cir.
1988)).
225. See District Court, 858 F.2d at 540, 542–44 (explaining that a reasonable mistake of
age defense is necessary because in certain instances there is no way a pornography pro-
ducer can be “absolutely sure” that an actor or actress is over eighteen).  The court further
noted, however, that this defense would be “implausible” in situations where the actor or
actress was obviously a prepubescent child. Id. at 542.
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firmative defense the Ninth Circuit adopted would not apply to defen-
dant Malloy’s situation.226  Although the reasonable mistake of age
defense adopted in District Court would not be appropriate for Malloy
himself to raise, future criminal defendants with factual situations sim-
ilar to the defendant in District Court would and should be able to raise
such a defense.227  Noting that the District Court rule would not help
Malloy, the court refused to adopt any affirmative defense.228  Instead
of rejecting an affirmative defense completely, the court could have
elected to adopt the narrow affirmative defense detailed in District
Court while simultaneously upholding Malloy’s conviction.
Furthermore, in adopting District Court’s narrowly tailored affirm-
ative defense, the Malloy court could have maintained its primary goal
of protecting the well-being of minors.  Emphasizing the Govern-
ment’s interest in protecting children from being sexually abused in
the pornography industry, the court cited Ferber to justify its hold-
ing.229  The Fourth Circuit failed to note, however, that equally as im-
portant as protecting the well-being of children in our society, the
First Amendment mightily protects freedom of speech in our Nation
and “is as close to an absolute as we have in our jurisprudence.”230
Although judges may individually feel aversion to the speech at issue
in cases such as this, such aversion does not discharge the court’s duty
to protect the Constitution.231  Had the Malloy court adopted a nar-
rowly tailored affirmative defense, moreover, it could have properly
226. Malloy, 568 F.3d at 173 & n.2.  The Fourth Circuit reasoned that because Malloy
merely asked S.G. her age and never investigated her true age further, he would be unable
to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard set forth in District Court. Id. at 173 n.2
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Although Malloy requested that the court lower the
evidentiary standard to a preponderance of the evidence standard, the court refused to
accept the argument that § 2251(a) constitutionally necessitates an affirmative defense. Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
227. See District Court, 858 F.2d at 540 (explaining that “[e]ven after taking the most
elaborate steps to determine how old the subject is, as defendants claim they did here, a
producer may still face up to ten years in prison and a $100,000 fine for each count”
(citation omitted)).
228. See Malloy, 568 F.3d at 173 (failing to acknowledge the possibility that such a situa-
tion may arise, despite sister circuit precedent to the contrary).
229. Id. at 175 & n.5 (“‘[A] democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens.’” (quoting
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982))).
230. District Court, 858 F.2d at 541.
231. See id. (“The distaste we may feel as individuals toward the content or message of
protected expression cannot, of course, detain us from discharging our duty as guardians
of the Constitution.”).
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balanced the competing interests of protecting children from sexual
abuse and preserving First Amendment rights.232
2. By Following the Gilmour Majority, the Malloy Court Set the
Stage to Chill Constitutionally Protected Speech in the Fourth
Circuit
When it refused to judicially engraft a reasonable mistake of age
defense for criminal defendants charged with Section 2251(a) crimes,
the Malloy court set the stage to chill future constitutionally protected
speech in the Fourth Circuit.  Future pornography producers will in-
evitably be chilled by the Malloy court’s decision to impose criminal
sanctions on a strict liability basis.233  From this point forward, pornog-
raphy producers who diligently investigate the age of their actors and
actresses and reasonably believe they are filming adults may wrong-
fully be held strictly liable despite First Amendment protection.234  As
the Supreme Court noted in its landmark decision regarding libel
under the First Amendment in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,235 “free-
doms of expression are to have . . . breathing space.”236  Such breath-
ing space should allow a pornography producer the opportunity to
defend himself against a Section 2251(a) charge when he can prove
that he independently investigated the age of the actor or actress he
filmed and believed in good faith that the individual he filmed had
achieved the age of majority.237  With its decision in Malloy, however,
the court has denied future criminal defendants in the Fourth Circuit
any such breathing space.
When governments possess the ability to restrict speech, greater
consequences may be imminent.  As one court noted:
Free speech has been on balance an ally of those seeking
change.  Governments that want stasis start by restricting
232. See id. at 541–42 (explaining that the First Amendment mandates a reasonable mis-
take of age defense to be available for defendants charged with § 2251(a) offenses).
233. See id. at 540 (reading Supreme Court precedent to indicate that First Amendment
jurisprudence does not allow strict liability where doing so would chill constitutionally pro-
tected speech).
234. See id. at 542 (explaining that a reasonable mistake of age defense is necessary to
protect “the heartland of political, literary and scientific expression and debate”).
235. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
236. Id. at 271–72 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
237. Cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (noting that breathing
space in the libel context requires the plaintiff to prove the requisite level of culpability).
Here, the court stated, “[B]reathing space is provided by a constitutional rule that allows
public figures to recover for libel or defamation only when they can prove both that the
statement was false and that the statement was made with the requisite level of culpability.”
Id.
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speech. . . .  Change in any complex system ultimately de-
pends on the ability of outsiders to challenge accepted views
and the reigning institutions.  Without a strong guarantee of
freedom of speech, there is no effective right to challenge
what is.238
To avoid silencing change and those seeking change in society, there-
fore, courts must vigilantly protect First Amendment rights.239  By fail-
ing to engraft a reasonable mistake of age defense, the Fourth Circuit
has ensured that constitutionally protected speech will be chilled and
voices of change may be silenced.
V. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Malloy, the Fourth Circuit properly held that 18
U.S.C. § 2251(a) does not include knowledge of a victim’s age as an
element the Government must prove to convict a criminal defen-
dant,240 and it also rightly determined that Section 2251(a) does not
textually offer reasonable mistake of age as an affirmative defense.241
In so holding, however, the court unreasonably failed to judicially en-
graft a reasonable mistake of age defense pursuant to the Supreme
Court’s overbreadth doctrine.242  The Malloy court could have
achieved the same outcome and successfully protected minors from
sexual abuse in the pornography industry without universally denying
criminal defendants charged with Section 2251(a) violations a nar-
rowly tailored reasonable mistake of age defense.243  With its ruling,
238. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985).
239. See id. (insisting that any loss of the right to free speech will thwart any individual
attempt for change in society and enable government stasis).  In addition to protecting
First Amendment rights, the protection of pornographers’ rights may help collapse the
sexual repression of women wishing to participate in the pornography industry. Cf. RON-
ALD J. BERGER, PATRICIA SEARLES & CHARLES E. COTTLE, FEMINISM AND PORNOGRAPHY 40
(1991) (explaining that according to libertarian feminists, female sexual freedom involves
“transgressing ‘socially respectable categories of sexuality and refusing to draw the line
on . . . politically correct sexuality’” (quoting Ann Ferguson, Sex War: The Debate Between
Radical and Libertarian Feminists, 10 SIGNS 106, 109 (1984))).  Although libertarian feminists
certainly do not advocate for the sexual abuse of children in the pornography industry,
their advocacy for the social acceptance of pornography as a vehicle for women to reclaim
sexual power promotes pornography as a “progressive cultural force.” See id. at 43 (describ-
ing libertarian feminists’ advocacy for pornography in American society). But see id. at
34–35 (explaining that radical feminists believe that pornography further represses fe-
males and female sexuality in a patriarchal society).
240. See supra Part IV.A.1.
241. See supra Part IV.A.2.
242. See supra Part IV.B.1–2.
243. See supra Part IV.C.1.
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moreover, the Fourth Circuit set the stage to chill otherwise constitu-
tionally protected speech.244
244. See supra Part IV.C.2.
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